We consider a manufacturer of mass-customized modular products who orders components under demand uncertainty, and sets prices, produces to order, and trades excess components in a secondary market after this uncertainty is resolved. The sequence of events reflects, in a parsimonious fashion, the considerable reduction in demand uncertainty between the procurement stage and the selling season, typical of industries with long supply lead times and short product life cycles.
Introduction
We consider a firm that orders components while facing uncertain market conditions. After uncertainty is resolved, the firm sets product prices, assembles components into final products, and trades excess components in a secondary market (see Figure 1 for illustration). The product market as well as the secondary market are characterized by linear demand curves that are subject to additive random shocks. Considering a modular product that is assembled from a number of components, each of which exists in a number of different versions, we characterize the effects of demand correlation and variability on the value of production flexibility and expected profit, and show how these effects depend on component commonality.
Our model differs from traditional component commonality models in assuming that (i) product prices are set after uncertainty resolution and that (ii) the firm has the option to trade components in the secondary market after uncertainty resolution. Motivation for these two assumptions is the following.
Sequence of Events. Our sequence of events reflects, in a stylized fashion, industries that are characterized by short product life cycles, long procurement lead times, and the ability to set price in response to market conditions. In high technology and consumer electronics, for example, the rapid rate of innovation often results in product life cycles measured in months rather than years. 1 In the same industries, procurement lead times for major components (which are typically subcontracted to offshore suppliers) can be as long as six months (Kurawarwala and Matsuo 1996) . As a result, the component procurement decisions are often made well before a product is introduced in the market, and thus under substantial demand uncertainty. At the same time, because of the short selling season, manufacturers have no opportunity to reorder components from suppliers before the selling season is over.
Unlike the order quantities, prices typically can be adjusted at the beginning of the selling season when demand uncertainty is considerably reduced (through market testing, observing early sales, etc.). This is particularly common in the online market (a prevalent sales channel in the computer and electronics industries), where demand data are readily available and price changes are easy to implement (Chan et al. 2004 ). Similar to pricing, assembly decisions are made after most demand uncertainty is resolved because technology products can be typically assembled from components very quickly (Song and Yao 2002) . Decision timeline: Components must be ordered while demand conditions are uncertain; all other decisions are made after uncertainty is resolved.
First stage Second stage
• Product prices are set • Products are assembled • Extra components may be sold or purchased in the secondary market Uncertainty is resolved
• Components are ordered
Considering the significant reduction in demand uncertainty between the time when components are ordered (several months before the product introduction) and the time when pricing and assembly decisions are made (once the selling season starts), we assume that demand uncertainty is completely resolved between these two decision stages. A similar sequence of events (where price is set after demand uncertainty is fully resolved) has been considered by many researchers in operations management, 2 economics 3 as well as marketing. 4 In the marketing literature, for example, Chu (1992, p. 329) argues that "Because many retailers employ scanning devices and computers to make sophisticated use of their sales data true demand is revealed to the retailer upon [the product introduction]. Thus, except for the very short period of trial and error, it is assumed that the retailer sets the retail price under complete information." Secondary Market. A standard assumption in traditional inventory models is that excess inventory has a fixed salvage value and, similarly, inventory shortage results in a fixed penalty cost (backorder cost, lost profit margin, etc.). Although it has long been recognized that the salvage value of excess inventory should depend on the amount of excess (Hertz and Schaffir 1960) , a fixed salvage value has been used as an approximation by most researchers. Among the few exceptions is Cachon and Kök (2007, p. 276) , who argue that
The fixed salvage value assumption is questionable when a clearance price is rationally chosen in response to the events observed during the selling season.
[In] many practical applications of the [newsvendor] model the per-unit salvage value is not fixed, but rather depends on a clearance pricing decision: a small discount is needed with a popular product in short supply, whereas a deep discount is needed with an unpopular product in ample supply.
We avoid the assumption of the fixed salvage value by considering clearance pricing of excess inventory in a secondary market. The secondary market price of each component is determined endogenously by supply and demand. Thus, the higher the excess inventory of a particular component, the lower the clearance price (salvage value).
As a result of firms' inability to accurately forecast demand, highly liquid Internet-based spot markets for excess inventory have emerged in many industries, particularly those where product life cycles are short. In the computer and electronics industry, for example, online exchanges such as Converge, America II, and Smith & Associates help manufacturers absorb demand shocks by providing access to billions of dollars worth of components with short lead times.
To reflect this industry practice, we assume that the firm uses the secondary market not only to clear excess components, but also to purchase additional components in the selling season. Such dual sourcing, where a manufacturer relies on a long-term fixed-price supply contract as well as short-term spot market operations (particularly for memory chips and other electronic components) has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Kleindorfer and Wu 2003 , Milner and Kouvelis 2007 , Mendelson and Tunca 2007 .
The secondary market supply and demand curves, and thus, the resulting secondary market prices may be subject to random shocks. To reflect the considerable reduction in market uncertainty between the preintroduction stage and the selling season, we assume that these random shocks are realized before the firm makes pricing, assembly, and secondary market trading decisions.
An Illustrative Example. To illustrate the different parts of our stylized model with a single real-world application, we use the example of Hewlett-Packard (HP). Although HP outsources a large portion of manufacturing, it remains responsible for purchasing components and raw material and managing the inbound supply chains to its contract manufacturers. HP procures most components such as memory chips, hard drives, microprocessors, applicationspecific integrated circuits, and plastics using a "sourcing portfolio," which consists of the following three elements: (i) structured contracts wherein HP commits to buying a fixed quantity for a longer period of time, and which are used for "nearly certain" segments of demand; (ii) unstructured contracts that provide HP with some flexibility over the order quantity; and (iii) short-term sourcing from the spot market, which is used for the segments of demand above the base scenario (Nagali et al. 2008 ).
HP's reliance on make-to-order production means that it does not stock inventory of finished products, and all of its inventory is at component level (Carbone 2001) . " [HP] informs customers [directly or through a reseller like Staples] what products and features are available, and at what cost, and then asks customers to specify the configuration of the particular product they wish to purchase" (Billington et al. 2002, p. 34) . A quick assembly of the product according to customer specification is enabled by the modular product design.
According to Billington et al. (2002) , HP sets prices dynamically based on real-time procurement information (component inventories and availability from suppliers) as well as customers' needs and tastes, and thereby manages demand to match supply. Billington et al. (2002, p. 34 ) further explain: "[HP] can respond with flexible pricing and availability once it observes demand for these products and, in so doing, maximize revenue across products."
HP also participates in online auctions to sell off excess inventory.
"While most [spot market] transactions by companies such as HP involve purchases, these companies may also choose to (re)sell the components typically offered by their supply chain partners. This is most likely motivated by the need to reduce excess inventories created by weaker than expected demand for one or more of its products. On occasion, however, companies may choose to 'overbuy' components to benefit from volume discounts, or may find that in certain environments the components they hold may be more valuable than the products they are able to build with them." (Billington et al. 2002, p. 37) Summary of the Main Results. Our paper provides new insights into the joint effect of demand parameters and component commonality on the value of production flexibility. We prove, among others, the following results:
(1) The value of production flexibility and expected profit increase with demand correlation if, and only if, the degree of commonality between the corresponding products does not exceed a threshold. (Commonality depends on the number as well as importance of common components.) This is because any two products may be linked not only by sharing components with each other, but also by sharing different components with the same third product. As a result, an increase in demand correlation between two products has two effects. It increases the variability of demand for components that are shared by these two products, but it also synchronizes the consumption (and thus availability) of other components, which may be used as complements by other products. If two products have relatively low commonality, the latter desirable effect of their demand correlation dominates.
(2) The value of production flexibility and expected profit may each increase or decrease with demand variability, depending on demand correlations and component commonalities across the entire product line.
(3) When demand shocks are independent, the optimal product prices are positively correlated if, and only if, the degree of commonality between the products exceeds a threshold.
Relation to the Literature
To the best of our knowledge, these results have not been shown in the existing literature. In contrast, several papers have described situations where the benefits of flexibility (and other forms of risk pooling) decrease in demand correlation. Among these, our paper is most closely related to the seminal work by Fine and Freund (1990) (FF hereafter) , who examine the effect of demand variability and correlation on the value of resource flexibility. FF consider a firm that acquires production resources while facing linear demand curves subject to additive uncertainty, and chooses prices and output after this uncertainty is resolved. 5 Although their narrative is about flexible capacity (as opposed to common components), FF acknowledge that their "model can be recast to capture the economics of the common components stocking problem."
There are two key differences between our model and that of FF. The first one has to do with the input-output transformation technology. FF consider a firm that produces n products using n + 1 resources where resource i i = 1 n, is dedicated to product i, whereas resource n + 1 is flexible and can produce any of the n products. Importantly, each product requires a single resource that can be either dedicated or flexible. In our model, on the other hand, each product requires a unique combination of complementary resources. Although each product uses multiple resources and each resource is used by multiple products, no resource substitution is allowed in producing a particular product. The other key difference between our model and that of FF is our assumption that the firm clears all excess resources (or purchases additional resources) in the secondary market.
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Other influential papers showing the negative effect of demand correlation on the value of flexibility include Eppen (1979) , who examines the benefits of stock centralization for n-product newsvendor; Lee (1996) and Lee and Tang (1997) , who study the benefits of postponing differentiation of a common intermediate product into n end products, and Van Mieghem (2004) , who studies the benefits of component commonality in the case of two products and five components, where each product requires one dedicated component, and one component that can be either dedicated or common.
The reason why none of the above papers identifies a positive effect of demand correlation on the value of flexibility is that all of them consider scenarios where all pairs of products share the same common resource (flexible capacity, centralized stock, undifferentiated work-in-progress, common component), in which case the only effect of product demand correlation is to increase the variability of demand for this common resource. A paper that examines the effect of demand correlation assuming a more complex bill of material is Swaminathan and Tayur (1998) , who compare make-to-stock, make-to-order, and "vanilla box" production systems with N products and n components. However, Swaminathan and Tayur assume that all pairs of products have the same demand correlation. Thus, when they examine the effect of demand correlation, they vary the correlation coefficient between all pairs of products at the same time, whereas we show that the effect of demand correlation depends on the particular pair of products.
Our paper is related to the operations literature on component commonality, make-to-order systems, resource flexibility, stock centralization, and postponement. The component commonality literature includes Collier (1982) , Baker et al. (1986) , Gerchak et al. (1988) , and Groenevelt and Rudi (2000) , who analyze inventory cost reduction due to commonality. Newsvendor-based models on commonality have been generalized by Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002) . Complex mathematical programming formulations of commonality and assemble-to-order systems include Dogramaci (1979) , Swaminathan and Tayur (1998) , Thonemann and Brandeau (2000) , and Lu and Song (2005) . Plambeck and Ward (2006 , 2008 ) model assemble-to-order systems as a stochastic control problem. A review of the assemble-to-order literature is provided by Song and Zipkin (2003) . The related resource flexibility literature includes, in addition to FF, Van Mieghem (1998), Bish and Wang (2004) , Chod and Rudi (2005) , and many others. The benefits of risk pooling in distribution systems with multiple retailers are examined, among others, by Eppen (1979) , Eppen and Schrage (1981) , and Özer (2003) .
There are two streams of the postponement literature, both of which are related to our work. The first one studies the benefits of delaying the differentiation of common work-in-process into multiple products, and includes, among others, Lee (1996) , who analyzes the impact of postponement on the reduction of inventory; Lee and Tang (1997) , who examine the cost and benefits of redesigning a process for postponement; and Aviv and Federgruen (2001) , who investigate the benefits of postponement under serially correlated demands with unknown distributions. The other stream of the postponement literature examines the benefits of postponing capacity, production and pricing decisions after uncertainty is resolved, and includes, most prominently, Leland (1972) and Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) . A review of the postponement literature is provided by Swaminathan and Lee (2003) .
Finally, our paper contributes to the operations literature examining the use of spot markets as a secondary channel, which includes, e.g., Lee and Whang (2002) , Araman and Özer (2005) , Dong and Durbin (2005) , Milner and Kouvelis (2007) , and Mendelson and Tunca (2007) . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §2 we formulate the model and characterize the optimal solution. Our main analytical results are presented in §3. In §4 we further discuss some of our assumptions. In §5 we present numerical experiments. We conclude in §6. The notation used throughout the paper is summarized in Online Appendix 1. All proofs are relegated to Online Appendix 2. These appendices are available as part of the online version that can be found at http://or.pubs.informs.org/.
Model
The expectation operator and variance-covariance matrix are denoted by Ɛ and , respectively. Vectors and matrices are denoted by bold lower-case and bold uppercase letters, respectively. All vectors are column vectors, and superscripts T and −1 denote transpose and inverse, respectively. The identity matrix is denoted I. A matrix or vector whose elements are all 0s (1s) is denoted as 0 (1).
Production Technology. We consider a firm that produces n different products using m different inputs or components. (We will use the terms "input" and "component" interchangeably). Production technology is defined using an m × n technology matrix A, where (A) ij is the amount of input i used by one unit of product j. Thus, output vector y requires input vector Ay. For now, we allow a general technology matrix A, i.e., any of the n products may use any amount of any of the m inputs. (To derive the key comparative statics, we will later focus on a modular product consisting of k components each of which is available in l versions, in which case n = l k and m = lk.)
Product Demand. The firm faces stochastic downward-sloping demand curves for all of its products. The products are allowed to be substitutes or complements, i.e., demand for any product may depend on the price of any other product. We assume the demand-price relationship to be linear, i.e., the demand curves are given by
where p is the price vector, > 0 is the vector of demand curve intercepts, y is the output vector, and matrix D captures the demand sensitivity to prices. Because of the inverse relationship between demand and price, we have (D) ii > 0 for all i. If (D) ij > 0, products i and j are substitutes, and if (D) ij < 0, they are complements. As is standard in the economics literature, we assume that D is symmetric, positive definite, and invertible.
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To reflect demand uncertainty, we assume that is a random vector with mean and covariance matrix . Because a higher realization of i means that customers are willing to pay more for product i, we refer to as "demand conditions." Secondary Market. Besides selling end products to customers, the firm can sell unused components or purchase additional components in the secondary market. The component prices in the secondary market are determined endogenously through supply and demand. We assume that the demand (supply) curves in the secondary market are also linear. In formulating the firm's decision problem, we will think of each component as if it were a special "product" whose bill of material involves a single component. The only difference of such a single-component "product" from a regular end product is that its output may be positive as well as negative because components can be sold as well as purchased in the secondary market.
To distinguish between end products and components, we partition the output vector as y
, where y 1 is the output vector of the n end products and y T 2 is the "output vector" of the m components. Similarly, we partition the price vector p
, and price sensitivity matrix
, where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to end product and secondary market, respectively. 8 Finally, we define a new technology matrix B = A I where the identity matrix I reflects the special "products" consisting of a single component each.
Sequence of Events.
We consider a single-period model with two decision stages. In the first stage, when the demand shock vector is uncertain, the firm must order components from its suppliers. The vector of component order quantities is denoted as x, and referred to as the "input vector." The vector of unit component costs is denoted as c and is assumed to be exogenous. Thus, the total cost incurred in the first stage is x T c. In the second stage, demand conditions are revealed and the firm makes all remaining decisions, i.e., (i) it sets end-product prices, (ii) it assembles end products, and (iii) it sells or purchases extra components in the secondary market. This sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Optimization Problem. The firm's total realized profit can be written as
where p y is given by (1) . The first term represents the input (component) cost incurred ex ante. The second term represents the revenue generated by selling end products to customers, plus the revenue generated by selling excess components in the secondary market, minus the cost of components purchased in the secondary market. Although we do not explicitly model the cost of production (assembly), this is done without loss of generality as long as the unit production cost is constant. (One can simply interpret each end-product price as price minus the unit production cost.) The firm's decision problem is the following two-stage stochastic program:
subject to y 1 0 and By = x
In the first stage (while is uncertain), the firm chooses the input vector x to maximize the expected profit. In the second stage (after is realized), the firm chooses endproduct prices, produces to order, and trades components at the market-clearing prices. Because of the one-to-one relationship between price and demand (1), the secondstage decision is equivalent to choosing the output vector y, which then uniquely determines the market-clearing price vector p y .
The first constraint, y 1 0, ensures that the output of each end product is nonnegative. The second constraint, By = x, ensures that all components are either used in production of end products or are sold in the secondary market. This constraint becomes more intuitive when written as Ay 1 + y 2 = x. The first vector, Ay 1 , represents the component quantities used to produce end-product output vector y 1 , whereas the second vector, y 2 , represents the component quantities traded in the secondary market. We are assuming that the total component usage Ay 1 + y 2 is equal to the initial component inventory x. In other words, all component inventory clears, either by use in production or in the secondary market. The "inventory clearance" assumption is fairly common in the literature (see, e.g., Deneckere et al. 1997 , Anand and Mendelson 1997 , Van Mieghem and Dada 1999 , and, in the risk-pooling context, Chod and Rudi 2005 , Goyal and Netessine 2007 , or Anand and Girotra 2007 .
To make our next assumption, we need to establish the following result.
It is also useful to define matrix
and to partition it as
where Q 1 is n × n.
Output Nonnegativity. To further facilitate analysis, we assume that the demand shock vector satisfies
with probability one. Condition (7) restricts the demand shock deviations from the mean so that the output nonnegativity constraint is never binding, which in turn allows a closed-form solution. Assuming that the demand shock distribution is appropriately bounded to guarantee output nonnegativity is fairly common in the economics literature (see e.g., Vives 1984, or Fershtman and Judd 1987.) Note that condition (7) is most restrictive when its right-hand side is small, i.e., when the material cost A T c is high relative to the mean demand shock 1 . Thus, everything else being equal, our model is more realistic when representing differentiated higher-end products, which tend to have higher (relative) profit margins. In §4 we discuss condition (7) in more detail and argue that with the expected profit margin at a level typical for companies such as HP, it is not very restrictive. Finally, in §5 we present results of a numerical study that confirm that our main analytical findings continue to hold even when is normally distributed, in which case condition (7) cannot be satisfied with probability one.
The Cost of Excess and Shortage. It is worthwhile to contrast the assumption of secondary market trading with traditional inventory models where the unit costs of inventory excess and shortage are assumed to be fixed. Suppose that the firm uses the secondary market to sell excess inventory of component i, i.e., y 2 i > 0. Whereas in the traditional newsvendor-like models the salvage value is assumed to be constant, in our model the unit salvage value of component i, p 2 i = 2 i − D 2 ii y 2 i , decreases in the quantity salvaged y 2 i , as one would expect in practice (Cachon and Kök 2007) . In other words, the unit cost of inventory excess, c i − p 2 i = c i − 2 i + D 2 ii y 2 i , increases in the amount of excess y 2 i .
Next, suppose that the firm uses the secondary market to purchase component i, i.e., y 2 i < 0. Again, whereas the newsvendor-based models assume the unit cost of inventory shortage (lost profit margin, cost of rush shipment, etc.) to be constant, in our model the unit cost of inventory shortage, 
The Optimal Solution. The next proposition characterizes the optimal solution. Proposition 1. The optimal output vector, its expected value, and covariance matrix are, respectively,
The optimal input vector and the corresponding expected profit are, respectively,
It immediately follows from Proposition 1 that Ɛp 2 y * = 1 2 2 + c . Thus, a higher initial component cost results, ceteris paribus, in a higher expected price at which this component is traded in the secondary market. When the supplier charges more for a particular component, the manufacturer orders less and relies more on the secondary market, which then drives up the secondary market price of this component. Also note that our model allows the expected secondary market price of any component to be lower than, higher than, or equal to its initial cost (depending on the relationship between 2 and c).
Analysis
For concreteness and tractability, we focus our analysis on products with modular architecture, which is typical of mass-customized, assembly-based products and has received considerable attention in the marketing and operations literatures (see, e.g., Sanchez 1999 , Ulrich and Eppinger 2004 , Hopp and Xu 2005 . In particular, we consider a product that consists of k components, each of An example of the product that involves two components, each available in two versions.
Components End products
which exists in l different versions. We refer to the set of all versions of a given component as a "component class." Thus, the firm offers n = l k end products that are assembled from m = kl different components. An example of a modular product with k = 2 and l = 2 is illustrated in Figure 2 . (To facilitate future references to this particular example, we label the four products based on their bill of material as (13), (14), (23), and (24), somewhat abusing the general notation where products are indexed from 1 to n.)
We will use the following notation. Indexes u and v will denote end products, whereas indexes r and s will be reserved for components. Recall the definition of technology matrix A where A ru = 1 if end product u uses component r, and A ru = 0 otherwise. For any component class i, we define an n × n matrix X i such that X i uv = 1 if end products u and v share a component of class i, and X i uv = 0 otherwise. Therefore, if we let
C uv equals the total number of components shared by end products u and v.
Finally, we define an m × m matrix Z so that Z rs = 1 if components r and s belong to different component classes (they are "technological complements") and Z rs = 0 if components r and s belong to the same component class (they are "technological substitutes").
To further facilitate analysis, we consider a special case of price-sensitivity matrix D. First, we assume that there are no cross-price effects, i.e., all off-diagonal elements of both D 1 and D 2 are zero. Second, we assume that all end-product demand curves have the same slope, i.e., D 1 uu = d 0 for any end product u. Finally, we assume that all components within a given class have the same slope of the secondary market demand (supply) curve, i.e., if component r belongs to component class i, then D 2 rr = d i . Thus, we can write
where all I and 0 submatrices are l × l. Although certainly stylized, this structure of the pricesensitivity matrix recognizes that not every component in a product's bill of material is equally important. Combining (12) Thus, the price-sensitivity matrix D given in (11) allows asymmetry of inventory mismatch cost across component classes, but it assumes the same inventory mismatch costs within each component class. In §5 we numerically examine the robustness of our analytical results while allowing asymmetry within a given component class as well as crossprice effects.
The next lemma is critical to our analysis. (6) is given as follows:
As we will see in the following subsection, parameter w i defined in (13) measures the "importance" of components of class i in assessing component commonality between two products. Note that w i increases with d i and recall that a higher d i corresponds to a higher unit cost of excess and shortage for components of class i. Therefore, a higher w i corresponds to a higher inventory mismatch cost of components of class i which means that more weight needs to be placed on components of this class when assessing component commonality.
In the next subsection, we examine how the expected profit depends on demand correlation.
Effects of Demand Correlation
There are three types of demand correlation: (i) correlation among end-product demands, (ii) correlation between an end-product demand and a secondary market component demand, and (iii) correlation among secondary market component demands. We characterize the effect of each of these correlations, starting with (i).
Proposition 2. The expected profit increases in demand correlation between end products u and v i.e., Ɛ x
* y * / uv > 0, if and only if
where
In the case of symmetric component classes, i.e., when d
According to Proposition 2, the expected profit increases in demand correlation between end products u and v if, and only if, these products have a relatively low component commonality, defined as a weighted sum of all of their common components,
where component of class i is weighted by its "importance" w i . When all components are equally important, component commonality, and thus the effect of demand correlation, depends on the sheer number of common components C uv .
To gain more insight into the relationship between component commonality and the effect of demand correlation, consider the example illustrated in Figure 2 with symmetric component parameters. According to Proposition 2, the expected profit in this example increases (decreases) in demand correlation between products with zero (one) common components. Higher demand correlation between products with a common component results in higher variability of the usage of this component, which, in line with intuition, reduces the efficacy of risk pooling and expected profit.
The reason why, in the same example, the expected profit increases in demand correlation between products without a common component is the following. Suppose that demand for product (14) is relatively high. The high demand for product (14) results in a high usage of its components (1) and (4), limiting the output of products (13) and (24), which also use these two components. The limited output of products (13) and (24) then results in a relative abundance of components (2) and (3), which together constitute product (23). This is the situation when high demand for product (23) is particularly desirable. In other words, the firm benefits if demands for products (14) and (23), which do not share a common component, are positively correlated. In general, high demand for product u limits the output of products of high commonality with u. Thus, while high demand for product u increases the usage of components of u, it reduces the usage of other components, which makes high demand for products using these other components particularly valuable. In other words, the firm benefits from demands for low-commonality products being positively correlated.
The commonality threshold determining the effect of demand correlation depends on product architecture and product variety. Note that in the case of symmetric components, the commonality threshold 0 always increases in k and almost always 9 decreases in l. This makes sense. When products consist of many components (k is high), they tend to have a relatively high number of common components. Thus, the commonality threshold 0 is high. When each components exists in a high number of versions (l is high), products tend to have relatively few common components. Thus, the commonality threshold 0 is low.
The next two propositions characterize the effect of the remaining correlations assuming, for simplicity, symmetrical component parameters. 
To understand the effect of correlation between a product demand and a component demand, consider again the example from Figure 2 , and suppose that demand for product (14) is relatively high. Because components (1) and (4) used in product (14) are likely to be purchased by the firm from the secondary market, it is desirable that the secondary market demand (and hence price) for these components is relatively low. Furthermore, the relatively high usage of components (1) and (4) limits the output of products (13) and (24), which is likely to result in an excess inventory of components (2) and (3). Thus, components (2) and (3), which are not used in product (14), are likely to be sold in the secondary market and thus their high demand (price) in this market is desirable. In general, the expected profit increases in the correlation between demand for a product and demand for a component if and only if the product does not contain this component.
Finally, to build some intuition for the effect of correlation between component demands, consider the same example and suppose there is relatively high secondary market demand for component (1) . The resulting high price of this component is an incentive for the firm to sell this component in the secondary market. This limits the output of products (13) and (14) that use component 1, resulting in a relative excess of technologically complementary components (3) and (4). Because these components are then likely to be sold in the secondary market, it is desirable that they are highly demanded (priced) there. The relatively scarce component (1) can also be "substituted" with component (2), which is therefore likely to be purchased in the secondary market. It is thus desirable that the secondary market demand (price) of component (2) is low. In general, the expected profit increases in the correlation between component demands if and only if the components are technological complements.
Effects of Demand Variability
The next two propositions characterize the impact of the variability of a product demand shock and a component demand shock, respectively, assuming the simplest possible price-sensitivity matrix. Let i ≡ ii so that u is the standard deviation of u , demand shock associated with end product u, and n+r is the standard deviation of n+r , demand shock associated with component r. 
where 
According to Proposition 5, the effect of the variability of a product demand shock on expected profit depends on the covariances of this demand shock with all other demand shocks. Although the threshold condition determining this effect is rather involved, it has two straightforward implications. First, dividing both sides of (19) by u implies that the expected profit increases in product demand variability u when this variability exceeds a threshold. Second, if ij = 0 for all i = j, condition (19) is always satisfied, i.e., the expected profit always increases in product demand variability u when all demand shocks are independent. Similarly, Proposition 6 stipulates a threshold condition for the effect of component demand variability, which implies that the expected profit increases in the variability of a component demand shock when this variability exceeds a threshold or when all demand shocks are independent.
Next, we examine the implications of component commonality for the optimal pricing policy.
Optimal Prices
We have established that the firm benefits when demands for products with a high (low) degree of commonality move in the opposite (the same) direction. Because demand is a function of price, the commonality structure of the product line should be reflected in the pricing decision. In particular, we would expect the optimal price vector to increase (decrease) the correlation between demands for products characterized by a low (high) degree of commonality. Because pricing is endogenous in our model, we can verify our intuition. To isolate the effect that commonality has on the price correlation, we assume, for the next three propositions, that all demand shocks are independent. For simplicity, we also assume symmetric standard deviations and the simplest price-sensitivity matrix. Proposition 7 states that the optimal prices of two products are positively (negatively) correlated if and only if the products are characterized by a high (low) degree of commonality. This may seem counterintuitive. Because we want demands for products with a high (low) degree of commonality to be negatively (positively) correlated, one may argue that the firm should negatively (positively) correlate their prices. The optimal pricing policy is more subtle: When the level of demand for product u is high, the optimal price of product u is also high. The large output of product u (and the resulting large usage of components in its bill of material) makes it more economical to produce products of low commonality with product u than products of high commonality with product u. To induce the desired demand levels, the firm needs to set relatively low prices of products of low commonality with product u and relatively high prices of products of high commonality with product u. In other words, the optimal prices of products with high (low) commonality will tend to move in the same (opposite) direction, as stated in Proposition 7. Propositions 8 and 9 follow similar logic.
In reality, price correlation also depends on demand shock correlation, a factor that Propositions 7-9 disregard. In the last proposition, we characterize the effect of demand shock correlation on price covariance. (We expect its effect on price correlation to be similar, although it is more difficult to prove.) This result is very intuitive. Because a higher demand shock results in a higher price, there is a positive relationship between demand shock correlation and price correlation (although the latter also depends on commonality).
In the next subsection, we examine the benefits of making-to-order by considering an alternative scenario in which products are made to stock .
Make-to-Order vs. Make-to-Stock
So far, we have been assuming that the firm "makes to order," i.e., it assembles end products from components after demand uncertainty is resolved. Next, we consider an alternative "make-to-stock" scenario that differs from our base-case make-to-order model in that the output decision is made before demand conditions are revealed. The optimal input and output vectors in the make-to-stock scenario are thus given bŷ y x = arg max y x Ɛ x y subject to x = By
The optimal solution to (21) is characterized in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. The optimal output vector, input vector, and the corresponding expected profit in the make-to-stock scenario are, respectivelŷ y = Ɛy * x = Bŷ and Ɛ x ŷ = Ɛy * T DƐy *
By comparing the expected profit in the make-to-order scenario, Ɛ x * y * with the expected profit in the maketo-stock scenario, Ɛ x ŷ , we obtain the value of production flexibility.
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Corollary 1. The value of production flexibility is
By comparing (23) with (10), we observe that demand variability and correlation affect the value of production flexibility V in the same way in which they affect the expected make-to-order profit Ɛ x * y * . In other words, Propositions 2-6 can be restated with the value of flexibility V replacing expected profit Ɛ x * y * . This means, for example, that the value of flexibility increases in demand correlation if and only if the corresponding products have a relatively low degree of commonality.
To the best of our knowledge, a similar result has not been shown in the existing literature. In contrast, as discussed in §1, several papers have shown that the benefits of risk pooling (flexibility, commonality, etc.) decrease in demand correlation. , Swaminathan and Tayur 1998 , Van Mieghem 2004 , and many others.)
Discussion
In this section, we further discuss our assumptions related to the demand shock distribution and ex post (marketclearing) pricing.
Demand Shock Distribution
Output Nonnegativity. Recall condition (7), which we imposed on the demand shock distribution in order to guarantee output nonnegativity. It is reasonable to assume that when = , the optimal output of each end product is positive. If this is the case, condition (7) is satisfied at = . By continuity, it is also satisfied as long as the deviations of from are not too large. To gain some intuition for what "too large" means, consider the product design illustrated in Figure 2 with symmetrical parameters, c = c c c c T , 1 = T , 2 = c , and D = I. Even in this very simple example, is an eight-dimesional vector, and thus difficult to visualize. Therefore, we only illustrate how condition (7) restricts the distribution of ( 1 2 conditional on i = i for i = 3 8. In this case, condition (7) can be written as 1 2 ∈ , where is illustrated in Figure 3a for c ∈ 0 15 0 2 0 4 . Condition (7) is most restrictive when its right-hand side is small, i.e., when the material cost A T c is high relative to the mean demand shock 1 . This is exactly what Figure 3a shows: As the component cost c increases, the distribution of 1 2 is restricted to a smaller . As c increases from 0 15 to 0 4 , the expected profit margin of each end product, Ɛp i y * − A T c i /Ɛp i y * , decreases from 54% to 11%. Although for very low profit margins the distribution of 1 2 is restricted to a relatively small area, as the expected profit margin takes more realistic values, this area expands very quickly, allowing considerable levels of demand variability, particularly when 1 and 2 are positively correlated. In 2008, the gross profit margin (defined as the ratio of revenue minus manufacturing costs over revenue) of HP was 24.2% (Robertson 2008) , which, in our example, corresponds to c ≈ 0 3 and that is indicated in Figure 3a by the thick line. As is apparent from the figure, with the expected profit margin at a level typical for companies such as HP, condition (7) is indeed not very restrictive. In any case, everything else being equal, our model is more realistic when representing differentiated higher-end products which tend to have higher (relative) profit margins. This is consistent with our assumption that the firm has pricing power, which is also likely to be true in the case of differentiated high-end products as opposed to commoditylike, low-profit-margin products. When follows a distribution with an unbounded support (such as the normal distribution), condition (7) cannot be satisfied with probability one, and thus, we cannot rely on the closed-form solution characterized in Proposition 1. However, we verified that our comparative statics results (Propositions 2-9) continue to hold for a normally distributed in an extensive numerical study, the results of which we present in §5.
Price Nonnegativity. Under extreme demand shock realizations, our model can lead to negative prices. In the economics literature, this issue is typically ignored as a low-probability event.
11 In our model, we can ensure nonnegative prices by requiring 1 2 
The support of the demand shock distribution that satisfies (24) is illustrated in Figure 3b for the same parameter values that we used to plot Figure 3a. (The thick lines correspond again to the expected profit margin of approximately 24.2% ). We observe that condition (24) is not very restrictive even for a very low component cost c = 0 15 (54% expected profit margin). As the component cost increases and the expected profit margin takes more realistic values, condition (24) becomes even less of an issue.
Market-Clearing vs. Fixed Prices
An important assumption in our model is that end products as well as excess components are sold at market-clearing prices after demand uncertainty is resolved. In this subsection, we will show that similar "market-clearing" takes place even when prices are initially fixed. We will also show that for a simple example with four products and four components, the expected profit is maximized by the same demand correlation structure when prices are fixed, as in the case of market-clearing pricing.
Consider the simplest scenario with a single input and a single output, in which case the input order quantity x also equals the output level. In our model of market-clearing pricing, the firm orders quantity x at a unit cost c while facing uncertain demand shock . Once the uncertainty is resolved, the firm sells this quantity at the market-clearing price p x = − dx. The realized profit then equals
where the market-clearing price
increases in and decreases in x.
In the standard newsvendor model (with fixed price), the firm chooses quantity x at unit cost c while facing uncertain demand . Once the demand is realized, the firm sells quantity min x at a given price p, and salvages the remaining units x − min x at a salvage value h < p. The firm's realized profit can be written as
wherē
is the average price. The average price depends on how many units are sold at the regular price p and how many units are sold at the salvage value h, which in turn depends on demand . Similar to the market-clearing price (26), the average price (28) increases in and decreases in x. The only difference is that the average price, unlike the marketclearing price, is nonlinear in both and x. In any case, the market-clearing price can be interpreted as an approximation of the average price implicit in the newsvendor model. We now examine to what extent the logic of Proposition 2 applies when prices are fixed. Consider the assembly system illustrated in Figure 2 with symmetrical component parameters. Proposition 2 implies that the expected profit is maximized when products sharing no common components have perfectly positively correlated demands, whereas products sharing one common component have perfectly negatively correlated demands.
Next, consider the same assembly system in a standard newsvendor setting with fixed prices p 1 p 4 , stochastic demands 1 4 , and no secondary market. Suppose that demands follow a multivariate normal distribution with a mean vector and symmetric standard deviations. The firm must order components while demand is uncertain, but assembles end products to order. If we let x be the vector of component inventory, the expected profit can be written as
where G x 0 is the standard "uncertainty cost" consisting of the expected cost of inventory shortage and excess. It is straightforward to show that when products with no common component have perfectly positively correlated demands and products with one common component have perfectly negatively correlated demands, then the total demand for each component is constant, and therefore, G x = 0. In other words, the expected profit is maximized by the same demand correlation structure when prices are fixed, as in the case of market-clearing pricing.
Numerical Analysis
In this section, we summarize results of an extensive numerical study, which confirmed that most of our analytical results continue to hold when (i) is normally distributed, (ii) there are cross-price effects among product demands, and (iii) component parameters within a given component class are asymmetric. Our numerical study was based on a product design with k = l = 2 (as illustrated in Figure 2 ) and the following base-case parameter values:
8, ij = 0 5 for all end-product demand correlations, and ij = 0 for all secondary market and cross-market demand correlations.
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These parameters are chosen so that (i) the material cost represents 89% of the expected price of each product, (ii) the coefficient of variation of all end-product demands is 0.76, (iii) expected quantity of each component traded in the secondary market equals zero, (iv) the expected price elasticity of end-product demand, 1/y − 1, is much larger than the expected price elasticity of secondary market demand (supply), 1/ 10y − 1. The high component cost and high demand variability ensure that condition (7) is violated with high probability, putting our results through a tough robustness check. The fact that the secondary market demand (supply) curves are very inelastic means that the firm is highly penalized for trading in this market or, in other words, that the cost of inventory shortage/excess increases rapidly in the amount of shortage/excess.
We examined the effect of demand correlations and variability while varying (i) cross-price elasticity of demand and (ii) asymmetry between components in the first component class.
Cross-Price Effects. In deriving our analytical results, we assumed that there are no cross-price effects, i.e., all off-diagonal elements of D are zero. In reality, the firm's end products are likely to be substitutes, in which case the off-diagonal elements of D 1 will be positive.
13 Therefore, in the numerical study, we fixed the own-price effects at D 1 uu = 2 5, and varied the cross-price effects D 1 uv from 0 (independent products) to 2 (very strong substitutes) for all end-products u and v. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which shows the effect of demand correlation between products with a common component (Figure 4a ), the effect of demand correlation between products without a common component (Figure 4b) , and the effect of The effect of demand correlation and variability on expected profit at different levels of product substitutability and different levels of asymmetry between components of class 1. demand variability (Figure 4c ) on expected profit at different levels of product substitutability. Consistent with Proposition 2, expected profit decreases (increases) in demand correlation between products with (without) a common component. Consistent with Propositions 5, expected profit first decreases and then increases in product demand variability. Furthermore, as products become closer substitutes, the "market coverage" decreases, and so does expected profit.
Component Asymmetry. Another assumption behind our analytical results was that all components of a given class have the same slope of the secondary market demand curve, i.e., if component r belongs to component class i, then D 2 rr = d i . Because the slope of the secondary market demand curve determines the unit cost of excess/shortage (8), this is equivalent to assuming that all components within a given class are "equally important" from the inventory management perspective.
In reality, a firm may be offering some high-end (more expensive) and some low-end (cheaper) versions of a given component. One would also expect that a more expensive component will have a higher unit cost of shortage/excess, i.e., D 2 rr > D 2 ss if c r > c s . To reflect this in our numerical study, we fixed c 2 = c 3 = c 4 = 1 and varied c 1 from 0.2 (component 1 being a "low-end option") to 1.8 (component 1 being a "high-end option"). At the same time, we varied all other parameters of component 1 ( 5 5 D 55 ) to ensure that its secondary market price and thus the unit cost of shortage/excess increase proportionally to its cost c 1 . We also varied all parameters of the products containing component 1 ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 D 11 D 22 to ensure that the relative profit margins remain unchanged.
Our numerical experiments confirmed that all of our analytical results continue to hold even when different versions of a given component are asymmetric. Figure 4d shows the effect of demand correlation between products sharing component 1. As this component becomes more "high-end," expected profit increases, but at the same time, the "greater commonality" between products 1 and 2 makes higher demand correlation more detrimental. Figure 4e confirms that expected profit increases in demand correlation when products have no commonality. Finally, Figure 4f confirms that expected profit first decreases and then increases in demand variability.
Secondary Market. To assess the impact of the secondary market, we repeated all of the above experiments while increasing elasticity of the secondary market demand/supply curves (decreasing the diagonal elements of D 2 ). These experiments revealed one important phenomenon not captured by our analytics. When the secondary market demand/supply curves are very elastic and products are strong substitutes, expected profit decreases in demand correlation even when the corresponding products have no commonality.
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5 and its rationale is the following. Elastic secondary market means that the cost of inventory mismatch (8) is low, and therefore, the "risk-pooling argument" favoring positive demand correlation between products with no commonality is less important. At the same time, positive demand correlation increases price competition (cannibalization) between products that are substitutes, and thus, hurts profit. When the secondary market demand/supply curves are rather elastic and end products are strong substitutes, expected profit decreases in demand correlation even when the corresponding products have no commonality. 
Conclusion
This paper studies component procurement, assembly, and product pricing while considering a fairly general bill of material that is characteristic of mass-customized products with a modular design. We challenge the commonly accepted wisdom that the benefits of flexibility always increase with demand variability and decrease with the correlation between demands for products that rely on a common resource. We show that the effects of both demand variability and correlation depend critically on the commonality structure of the entire product line. For example, we prove that the benefits of flexibility increase in demand correlation if, and only if, the corresponding products have a relatively low degree of commonality, which depends on the number as well as on the importance of common components. We also show how product pricing should be used to maximize the benefits of flexibility. In particular, we prove that a high degree of commonality between two products is a reason for their optimal prices to move in the same direction.
Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the online version that can be found at http://or.journal. informs.org/.
Endnotes concavity of this approximate utility function. Intuitively, positive definiteness guarantees that the effect of a marginal price increase on the product demand is more significant than the sum of its effects on other product demands.
8. Note that this structure of D assumes zero cross-price effects between the end product and the secondary market. We also assume, for simplicity, that all off-diagonal elements of D 2 are zero, i.e., there are no cross-price effects in the secondary market.
9. 0 is decreasing in l ⇔ dkl k−1 > k − 2 d 0 , which is the case unless the secondary market demand is extremely elastic relative to the end-product demand.
10. In practice, make-to-stock production is likely to be less costly than make-to-order production. We could account for a lower production cost in the make-to-stock scenario by increasing the corresponding 1 , which would result in a higher make-to-stock profit and a lower value of production flexibility. However, this would not influence how the value of flexibility depends on demand variability and correlation, which is the focus of our analysis.
11. See, e.g., Vives (1984, p. 77) : "Given our normality assumption Firms are constrained to choose positive prices and quantities. For convenience, we ignore this, and we can get negative prices and outputs for certain combinations of [parameters] . The probability of such an event can be made arbitrarily small by appropriately choosing the variance of the model."
12. Only when examining the effect of a particular correlation ij , we fixed all other correlations at zero to ensure that the correlation matrix remained positive semidefinite as ij varied from −1 and 1.
13. Given our transformation technology, different products are essentially "different versions" of a product, and thus, are unlikely to be complements.
